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The present Annual Survey is an additional link in the series of Annual Surveys published 
by the National Insurance Institute of Israel (NII). It covers the activities of the NII for 
2002-2003, in view of the turnabout in the government’s social policy as reflected in the 
five economic plans approved by the Knesset (Israel’s Parliament) during those years. 
 
The first chapter summarizes the main points of the new social policy, surveying the 
changes introduced into the various programs under the responsibility of the NII and 
those in the means of financing these programs. A distinction is drawn between programs 
aimed at the working-age population and those meant for the population that has left the 
workforce. Both immediate and long-term implications of the new legislation on the 
conditions of entitlement to benefits and on their level are discussed. 
 
The second chapter presents the picture of poverty and income inequality in Israel in 
2002, focusing this time on additional approaches to the measurement of poverty in Israel 
and in selected Western countries. 
 
Special chapters are devoted to developments in the income support system (Chapter 
Three), in the sphere of collection of national and health insurance contributions (Chapter 
Four), and in the main insurance branches (Chapter Five). The Survey also includes an 
English summary of the first chapter and of the trends in poverty and income distribution. 
 
The Survey includes three Appendices: an Appendix of Publications – summaries of 
research reports and surveys published by the Research and Planning Administration in 
2002-2003 and of the research reports of the Fund for Demonstration Projects – an 
Insurance Branch Table Appendix and a Poverty and Inequality Table Appendix.   
I extend my thanks to the employees of the Research and Planning Administration who 
assisted in the preparation of the Survey and bringing it to print, and particularly to Mia 
Orev-HaTal, who carried out the linguistic editing. A special thanks is due to Or-el 
Abutbul and Nira Amir, who bore the burden of the typing, for work carried out with 
willingness, initiative and devotion. 
 
Leah Achdut 
Deputy Director-General for Research and Planning Preface  
by the Director General 
 
The years 2002-2003, covered in this Survey, were overshadowed by a severe 
economic recession in Israel and a turnabout in the government’s social policy. The 
recession led to a fall in the standard of living, an expansion of unemployment and an 
erosion of wages. Further, in the framework of five economic plans approved by the 
Knesset (Israel’s Parliament), deep structural changes were instituted in the benefit 
system of the National Insurance Institute (NII), including significant reductions in the 
level of most of the benefits. This Survey discusses the depth of the cutbacks in the 
benefits and their implications on the lives of families in Israel.  
 
There is a general consensus that the growing deficit of the State budget did not enable 
a cut in public expenditure without touching the transfer payments. The debate 
focused on the depth of the cut in social security benefits and on the government’s 
order of priorities, particularly regarding the mixture of the cutback in expenditure as 
compared to the decrease in the tax burden. 
 
In total, benefit payments were reduced in 2002-2003 by over NIS 5.5 billion, and the 
extent of their continued reduction in the coming years was pre-determined in the 
legislation. Total benefit payments (both cash and in-kind) in these two years fell by 
7.2% in real terms, most of the decline (5.7%) taking place in 2003. Were it not for the 
increase in the number of benefit recipients, a sharper decrease in payments would 
have been observed, more accurately reflecting the depth of the cutback.  
 
All population groups were affected by the new government policy, but the benefits 
aimed at the working-age population  – unemployment, income support and child (family) allowances – were struck the hardest. The cutback in each one of these 
systems has thus far amounted to about a third of the total benefit payments paid 
previous to the new legislation, and in child allowances it will continue till the end of 
the decade. In addition, the government abandoned the perception according to which 
the standard of living of benefit recipients should be maintained by linking the benefits 
to the average wage. This relative perception has guided the NII since the mid 70’s 
and played an important role in reducing poverty and income gaps in the country. The 
government decided to freeze benefit levels in 2002-2003, and as of 2006, link them to 
price rises only. In the coming years, the standard of living of the population at large 
will rise – but that of the elderly, the widows, the disabled and the other weak 
population sectors will remain behind. 
 
The picture of poverty and economic gaps in 2002 reflects some of the effects of the 
policy measures enacted in that year; their full influence will be expressed in data to 
be published in 2003. The cuts in payments to income support recipients and to 
families with children will be reflected in 2003 as well, but in the data for 2004 only. 
Still, the picture for 2002 is sufficient cause for concern, and most indicators point to 
deterioration in the country’s social situation. The decline in standard of living 
characterizes all strata of the population, but is particularly evident among families in 
the lower income deciles. In net income per standard person, the income level of the 
first and second deciles declined by 12% and 7% in real terms, respectively, as 
compared to 4.6% in the total population. The net income of families with children 
and working-age families without a breadwinner has eroded the most. The situation of 
the elderly, particularly the low-income elderly, was less affected; their income was 
eroded at lower rates. These trends are reflected in the 2002 poverty measures: the 
incidence of poverty among families remained the same – 17.7% of total families – 
but the poverty itself became more severe. The average poverty gap per poor family 
rose from 26% to 29%, and the rate of poor children out of the total number of children continued to rise, reaching 28.1%. On the other hand, the incidence of 
poverty among the elderly declined from 24% to about 20%.  
 
According to preliminary estimates, the incidence of poverty will rise to 18.5% by the 
end of 2003, and the average poverty gap per poor family will climb to 30% due to the 
deep cuts in the income support benefits and the child allowances, likely to lead to a 
smaller contribution of benefits to a reduction of income inequality.  It may also be 
surmised that the gaps according to net income – before the cuts – will widen even 
further. Not all strata of the population will benefit from the fruits of the economic 
growth, just beginning to bud at the time of this writing. Not only will benefits not be 
adjusted, but it will take time for the economic growth to filter down to the low 
deciles, particularly to the weak links of the labor force. 
 
As every citizen is aware, these years have been difficult ones for the National 
Insurance Institute and its employees. The NII is doing its utmost to fight the 
economic decrees in the government and Knesset, and to lessen the blow to the weak 
population groups. By all the means at our disposal, we have tried to convince the 
policy-makers that this new policy dangers the very existence of thousands of families 
in Israel and the integrity of society as a whole. Our efforts, unfortunately, have not 
been successful.We have had to invest huge resources in the preparation and 
implementation of a torrent of amendments to the National Insurance Law and other 
social security legislation.  
 
This legislation of the past two years has verily changed the face of the social security 
system of Israel. Some of it has been enacted due to budgetary stress; others reflect the 
policymakers’ stand regarding the nature of the welfare state and the role of the 
National Insurance Institute. This stand is not accepted in all circles, and the policy it has yielded is the subject of dispute. However, history teaches us that welfare 
perceptions come and go, according to changing economic and social circumstances.  
 
In 2004, the National Insurance Institute of Israel celebrated its fiftieth birthday. Many 
challenges await us, and intensive efforts are required to meet them. As the main body 
responsible for social security, we need to reconsider our targets in the coming years 
and our role in the formulation of social policy.  We must seek to improve our image 
in the government, the Knesset and the public at large, since support of the NII is an 
essential condition for success in reaching fuller take-up of rights, without exploitation 
of the system, and for promoting the welfare and well-being of the population 
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Chapter  1 
 
Trends of Development in National Insurance 
 
Leah Achdut  
1.1   Introduction 
 
In 2002-2003, the government of Israel decided on a complete turnabout in its social 
policy, to mark its stamp on the welfare state in the country for many years to come.  
Under five different economic programs approved by the Knesset (Israel’s 
Parliament), deep structural changes were introduced in the benefit system of the 
National Insurance Institute (NII), together with a significant reduction in the level of 
most benefits.  The list of decrees hurting benefits that were implemented in 2002-
2003 and the ones expected in the coming years is lengthy, and affected all population 
groups. The depth of the immediate cutbacks was particularly notable in the benefits 
aimed at the working-age population – unemployment, income support and child 
(family) allowance.  The cutback in each one of these systems has thus far amounted 
to about a third of the total benefit payments paid previous to the new legislation, and 
in child allowances it will continue till the end of the decade.  The influence of the 
structural changes was already partially felt in 2002-2003, and will become intensified 
in the coming years. Deeply implanted perceptions of the welfare state, formulated 
over two to three decades – such as maintaining the standard of living of benefit 
recipients relative to that of the population at large – were abruptly abandoned, from 
one day to the next, without any comprehensive public discussion. The new policy has 
punctured the social security net of the country and wiped out hard-gained 
achievements of many years. 
 
The turnabout in the government’s social policy stemmed originally from the 
budgetary distress resulting from the 2001-2003 recession, expressed in a fall in the 
standard of living, an expansion in unemployment and an erosion of wages.  The 
government’s income from taxes dropped drastically, the deficit in the state budget 
grew, and NII benefits were cut in keeping with the policy to reduce government 
expenditure. No one disputes the fact that the new fiscal policy had to include transfer 
payments, which constituted a significant share of government expenditure.  The 
debate on the new policy focused on the depth of the cuts in benefits and on the 
government’s order of priorities, particularly with regard to the mixture of the cutback 
in expenditure as compared to the decrease in the tax burden.  In 2002-2003, NII 
benefits were cut by about NIS 5 billion.  Total benefit payments (both cash and in-
kind) in those two years fell by 7.2% in real terms, most of the decline (5.7%) taking 
place in 2003, decreasing from 9.42% to 8.88% of the GDP.  Were it not for the 
increase in the number of benefit recipients, a sharper decrease would have been 
observed, more accurately reflecting the depth of the cutback.   
 
There is general agreement, even among those who support the government’s path, 
that the new policy did not arise solely from budgetary distress, but also reflected the 
domination of those believing in small government at the junction of policy-making.  E12  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
 
This perception is what actually led to a reduction in public expenditure, which was 
first accompanied by an increase in the tax burden  – and later on by its decrease.  The 
public debate in 2003 was not about the implementation of the income tax reform in 
principle, but rather about its implementation earlier and within a shorter period of 
time than originally determined.  Social considerations such as guaranteeing a 
minimum income for subsistence and preventing an expansion of poverty or a 
deepening of economic polarization were not given adequate consideration; on the 
contrary, they were completely alien to the set of considerations underlying the 
government’s policy.  The population groups in need of state social services and 
particularly those most hurt by the recession were made to carry the heaviest burden of 
the economic recovery.  In a very brief period of time the government implemented a 
policy that deeply eroded the benefits paid to the elderly, the unemployed and families 
with children.  Even if it is agreed that changes in the benefit system were required in 
order to reduce its inherent disincentives to work, these did not demand such deep and 
sharp cuts, which in fact preceded any attempt on the part of the active policy 
leadership to help unemployed benefit recipients find work.  
 
Government policy in 2004-2006 and afterwards proves that the perception of “less 
public expenditure and lower taxes” will continue to make its mark on the economy 
and on society in Israel. The legislation enacted in 2002-2003 determined benefit 
levels not only for those specific years but for the future as well.  Even if the economy 
grows in 2004-2006, the level of benefits will not go up in 2005, due to the freeze 
imposed upon them till 2006. Furthermore, cuts in benefits will continue due to the 
cancellation of the linkage to the average wage. 
 
The achievement of the government’s economic targets in the coming years will be at 
the expense of the population groups in need of social services and of the benefit 
recipients. The government decided to limit public expenditure by means of two 
measures: the deficit target in the state budget will be 4% in 2004, but will be 
gradually reduced in the following years, and in parallel, government expenditure 
would not exceed 1% in real terms.  Even if the economy grows and income from 
taxes rises, and even if the deficit target is achieved, no additional resources will be 
freed to increase public expenditure.  A growth of 1% in government expenditure 
(including NII activities) does not even compensate for the natural growth of the 
population, and the “competition” between social and defense expenditure in the 
government’s order of priorities will be intensified even further.  Moreover, in order to 
prevent pressures to increase public expenditure in the coming years, the Treasury 
embarks time and time again on a policy of lowering taxes; in addition to advancing 
the income tax reform to an earlier date, it is planned to reduce the VAT and the sales 
tax, and it is proposed to lower the rate of national insurance contributions imposed on 
employers as well as profit taxes. The resources to be added to the state budget as a Trends of Development in National Insurance   13 E  
 
result of the hoped-for growth are  – or will be – directed towards the lowering of 
taxes, and the deficit target will apparently be achieved only by means of an additional 
cutback in public expenditure, particularly in the social services. 
 
Yet this is not all. The new policy has been accompanied by an undermining of public 
support for the welfare state in Israel, and by a campaign of de-legitimazation of the 
weak population groups, particularly of the unemployed, who are being blamed for 
their unemployment.  This campaign did not omit the NII as the main body 
responsible for social security in Israel. At times the unemployed are blamed for 
cheating the NII and at times the NII is blamed for faulty administration, causing a 





1.2   The National Insurance System After the 2002-2003 Legislation 
 
The five economic programs approved by the Knesset in 2002-2003 and in early 2004 
include a long list of changes in the two components of the national insurance system 
– benefits and collection.  The changes are structural for the most part; to a smaller 
degree they include temporary or permanent reductions in benefit levels with no 
essential change in the structure of the programs or in rules of entitlement to benefits.  
Amendments were enacted in programs which pay benefits both to the working-age 
population and to the retired population, and they affected the basic principles that had 
underlined the policy of adjusting benefits – both those guaranteeing a minimum 
income for subsistence and those replacing wages for short periods of time. The main 
amendments in the various branches are summed up in the Boxes appearing at the end 
of this chapter. 
 
1.2.1  Adjustment of Benefits   
 
One of the most far-reaching structural changes introduced in the national insurance 
system under the new legislation is that pertaining to the method of adjusting benefits 
and to the parameters of collecting insurance contributions, both linked until 2002 to 
changes in the average wage.  The formulation of the policy of adjusting national 
insurance benefits in the mid 70’s was one of the most important stages in the 
development of the welfare state in Israel. The benefits were linked to changes in the 
average wage, out of the perception that benefit levels should be adapted to the 
standard of living of the population as a whole, and to prevent a situation whereby this 
standard of living rises and that of the weak population sectors lag behind. Since the 
mid 70’s, the old-age and survivors’ pensions, general disability pensions, income E14  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
 
support benefit and alimony benefit were all determined in the law as percentages of 
the average wage and adjusted in accordance with the changes thereof. The average 
wage also served as a measure for adjusting the wage-replacing benefits, the collection 
parameters, and later on, for adjusting the minimum wage as well.  Only the child 
allowances, linked to the income tax system, were adapted to price fluctuations. This 
policy of benefit adjustment has had an overriding role in reducing poverty (which 
also had been measured in Israel by means of the relative approach) and income gaps 
in the country. Even at times of crisis, when a stringent economic policy was put 
forward, such as the Economy Stability Policy of 1985, policymakers were careful to 
retain – and even to improve – the adjustment mechanisms. 
 
In 2002, for the first time since the mid 70’s, the Knesset approved a government 
decision not to adjust most benefits, as a temporary order for ten months, later 
extended in two stages: first till the end of 2003 and afterwards till the end of 2005.  
Further, it was broadened to cover all benefits paid by the NII.  What is more, the 
government determined that beginning in 2006, benefits would be adjusted in 
accordance with price rises only, and not according to changes in the average wage, 
out of a new perception that the state’s task should be limited to maintaining the 
purchasing power of the benefits only.  
 
 
1.2.2    Changes in Benefits to the Working-age Population 
 
The legislation of 2002-2003 changed beyond recognition three out of the four 
programs providing benefits to the working-age population: unemployment insurance, 
income support and child allowances.  Legislative changes were introduced in work 
injury insurance and maternity insurance as well, such as lowering the benefit level 
(beyond the lateral reduction of 4% till the end of 2006) and shortening the maximum 
period of entitlement.  On the other hand, the benefits provided in the framework of 
general disability insurance were barely affected in 2002-2003 by the government’s 
socio-economic policy; the 4% lateral reduction did not apply to disability benefits; 
they were adjusted in 2002  (but not in 2003) in accordance with wage rises.  It should 
be noted that in 1999-2002, following the strikes of the disabled population, 
amendments were enacted that improved the situation of people with disabilities, 
particularly those with severe disabilities – both adults and children. 
 
Unemployment   
 
Since the early 70’s the government has embarked on a policy that gradually 
undermined the role of unemployment insurance as a safety net for workers who lost 
their jobs and as a mechanism for helping the unemployed utilize their earning Trends of Development in National Insurance   15 E  
 
potential by searching for work suitable to their skills.  This policy was intensified in 
2002-2003, during which extremely stringent changes were made in unemployment 
insurance: benefits were reduced, the maximum period for payment of benefits was 
shortened, and the conditions of entitlement were made stricter, mainly by means of 
lengthening the qualifying period.  Even before the many amendments to the 
unemployment insurance came into effect, it was one of the strictest in Western 
countries – all the more so after the changes of 2002-2003. 
 
Children   
 
The legislation approved in 2002-2003 led to far-reaching changes in the system of 
child (family) allowances.  These included, in addition to a structural change in the 
level of allowance in accordance with family size, a sharp reduction in allowance rates 
and in the public expenditure on support to families with children.  These changes 
were anchored in four economic programs, and from one program to the next the cut 
in the allowances deepened.  When the implementation of all the changes is completed 
in 2009, the level of the child allowance will be equal for every child, and lower than 
that paid to each of the first two children before this policy was instituted. 
 
Income Support to the Working-age Population   
 
The public debate on the social policy of the government in 2002-2003 reached its 
height when the government decided on a series of far-reaching changes in the income 
support system to the working-age population, the main ones being anchored in the 
Economy Arrangements Law of 2003.  This policy was introduced as part of a labor 
force reform and was aimed – according to those who formulated it – at reducing the 
extent of the reliance of benefit recipients on the support system and encouraging 
them to join the labor market. The rise in the number of income support recipients, 
particularly in the past decade, was attributed to the “exceptional generosity” of the 
benefit and the range of various bonuses granted to benefit recipients in the fields of 
housing, health, public transportation, etc. This was in addition to the consideration of 
the failure of the employment service to carry out the employment test strictly and 
efficiently, and to find employment solutions to those benefit recipients who sought 
work – whether as a result of the expansion of unemployment, a lack of resources, or 
the fact that the employment service did not change its method of operation or adapt 
more modern approaches of dealing with its special clientele.  
 
The new legislation applied to all components of the Income Support Law: level of 
benefit, income test and employment test. 
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Table  1:  Income Support Benefit and Child Allowances: February 2004 
Compared to January 2002 
 





















        
Single-parent family with 2 children 
        
Without income from work  3,527  2,607  3,875  2,847  1,028  -26.5 
Half minimum wage  3,267  1,927  3,615  2,167  1,447  -40.0 
Minimum wage  2,286  967  2,634  1,207  1,427  -54.2 
            
Couple with 2 children – regular rate 
        
Without income from work  2,961  2,240  3,309  2,480  829  -25.1 
Half minimum wage  2,701  1,531  3,049  1,771  1,278  -41.9 
Minimum wage  1,067  531  1,415  771  644  45.5 
         
Couple with 2 children – increased rate 
        
Without income from work  3,490  2,607  3,838  2,847  991  -25.8 
Half minimum wage  3,229  1,899  3,577  2,139  1,438  -40.2 
Minimum wage  1,595  899  1,943  1,139  804  -41.1 
         
New entrants – couple with 2 children, one spouse aged 46-54 
        
Without income from work  3,490  2,240  3,838  2,480  1,358  -35.4 
Half minimum wage  3,229  1,531  3,577  1,771  1,806  -50.5 
Minimum wage  1,595  531  1,943  771  1,172  -60.3 
         
Couple with 4 children – increased rate 
        
Without income from work  3,490  2,607  4,888  3,448  1,440  -29.5 
Half minimum wage  3,229  1,899  4,627  2,740  1,887  -40.8 
Minimum wage  1,595  899  2,993  1,740  1,253  -41.9 
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The above table shows the aggregate damage resulting from the cut in the income 
support benefit in June 2003 and the accumulated cut in the child allowance up to 
February 2004, as compared to the situation in January 2002.  The minimum income 
guaranteed to families with children without income from work fell drastically by 
amounts ranging from NIS 830 a month to those receiving income support benefit at 
the regular rate, to almost NIS 1,031 a month to single-parent families: a decrease of 
26% as compared to January 2002.  The income supplement benefit and the child 
allowance to families with two or more children having an income from work 
equivalent to half the average wage was shrivelled by about 40% (a cut ranging from 
about NIS 1,280 to families who received benefit at the regular rate, to about NIS 
1,450 to single-parent families or couples who received the benefit at the increased 
rate).  The income supplement to families whose income from work was equivalent to 





1.3    Changes in Benefits to the Retirement-Age Population   
 
1.3.1   The Reform in the Pension System 
 
In 2002-2003 the government decided on a far-reaching reform in both tiers of the 
pension system in Israel – The NII pension and the occupational pension.  From the 
point of view of income support to persons retiring from the workforce, it is important 
to examine government policy in relation to both tiers of the pension system, since 
each has a different role: the first tier aims at guaranteeing a minimum income to 
pensioners by means of a basic pension, while the second aims at maintaining the 
relative standard of living of the pensioners and preventing it from falling drastically.  
 
The most significant change introduced in the first tier is the cancellation of the 
linkage of pensions to the average wage. The implications of this change on the future 
level of benefits have been discussed above – the pensions were greatly eroded and the 
ability of the first tier to reduce poverty among the elderly was severely hampered.  
Only about 42% of the elderly population presently have pension from work, and the 
gaps in pension level among those who do have pension are even higher than the wage 
gaps in the economy.  About 64% have pension up to half the average wage.  The 
incidence of poverty among the elderly before transfer payments – mainly NII benefits 
– reaches some 60%.  Even after the pensions extract about two-thirds of the elderly 
families from poverty, about a fifth of them remain poor. 
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In 2003 the government decided on a structural reform in the occupational pensions, to 
supplement the pension reform of the mid 90’s.  The 2003 reform included both 
insured persons of working-age and retired persons, and was focussed on covering the 
deficit of the veteran pension funds.  The reform was in principle important and 
inevitable, but entails many risks.  The implications will be felt, for better or worse, in 
the coming years.  The government should re-examine the place of the first tier in the 
“new” pension system, from a social viewpoint, and in particular, should re-consider 
its policy regarding adjustment of NII pensions. 
 
 
1.3.2   Raising of Retirement Age and Age of Entitlement to Old-Age  
           Pension 
 
The raising of the retirement age as a means of meeting the need to allocate more and 
more resources to the financing of pension payments – mainly due to the rise in life 
expectancy at the older ages and to early retirement – applies to both tiers of the 
pension system.  In the spirit of the recommendations of the public committee to 
examine the retirement age (Netanyahu Committee, July 2000), the Retirement Age 
Law-2004 determined that the retirement age would be raised gradually to 67 for both 
men and women, although women aged 64-67 may choose to continue working, or to 
retire without any reduction in their pension.  The law determined that the conditional 
age of entitlement in old-age pension would be raised as well: for men to 67, and for 
women to 62 at first and to 64 at the second stage.  The absolute age of entitlement to 
pension (without income test) will also be raised gradually: from 65 to 70 for women, 
thus equalizing it to the present absolute age of entitlement for men.  The payment of 
the old-age pension for housewives will be gradually postponed from age 65 to age 
70. 
 
The raising of the retirement age will be adapted to the other NII benefits as well.  
Benefits such as survivors’ pension, disability pension, attendance allowance, income 
support benefit and unemployment benefit will be paid up to the new age of retirement 
and the long-term care benefit will be postponed until after this age. 
 
It is estimated that the raising of the age of entitlement to old-age pension will 
considerably improve the NII’s financial situation; however, government policy is not 
consistent in this respect. The savings resulting from the raising of the retirement age 
will be almost entirely set off by the loss of receipts of insurance contributions 
following the cancellation of the linkage to the average wage of the income ceiling 
liable for contributions.  The entire population, both working and non-working, will 
contribute to the savings in old-age pension payments and in the additional collection 
of contributions, whereas only the better-off workers will benefit from the reduction in Trends of Development in National Insurance   19 E  
 





1.4   Benefit Payments 
 
In 2003, total NII benefit payments –contributory and non-contributory benefits as 
well as additional payments carried out by the NII, mostly for government ministries – 
amounted to about NIS 44.9 billion, as compared to NIS 47.3 billion in 2002 and NIS 
45.5 billion in 2001.  These sums do not include the various administrative or 
operative expenses of the national insurance system.
1 
 
In 2002-2003, for the first time in decades, NII payments decreased in real terms by 
about 7.2%.  Most of the decrease  – 5.7%  – took place in 2003.  The benefit 
payments paid by the NII decreased from 9.42% of the GDP in 2001-2002 to 8.88% in 
2003.  This decrease would have been sharper, reflecting the scope of the cuts in the 
various benefits, had it not been for the rise in the number of benefit recipients.  The 
estimated accumulated cut in 2003 is about NIS 5 billion. 
 
The decrease in real terms in benefit payments characterized most national insurance 
branches and programs administered by the NII.  Payments decreased in real terms by 
about 35% in the unemployment branch, by about 24% in the children branch and by 
about 12% in income support.  In 2003 there was a sharp decline in payments of 
reserve service benefits, after a sharp rise in 2001-2002.  The real decrease in 
payments characterized the old-age and survivors branch as well – 3.7% in 2002 but 
no change in 2003 – as well as the maternity branch –  3.3%. 
 
There was a notable slowdown in the real growth rate of the work injury branch.  Had 
it not been for the rise in payments of benefits to hostile action casualties, included in 
this branch, the total payments would have gone down by about 1% in real terms.  
Payments to hostile action casualties grew 2.3 times in the past three years, reaching 
about NIS 350 million in 2003.  Even in the disability branch, which expanded 
considerably in 1999-2002 – following the favorable legislation put into effect after 
the strikes of the disabled population – the growth in payments slowed down (3%), 
more or less reflecting a rise in the number of recipients only.  Payments in the long-
tem care branch decreased by about 2% in real terms in 2003, while payments in the 
bankruptcy branch increased as a result of the deepening recession.   
 
                                                      
1 These expenses are estimated at about 1.2 billion in 2003.  E20  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
 
Payments of the contributory benefits under the National Insurance Law decreased by 
about 6.6% in real terms in 2002-2003, while payments of the non-contributory 
benefits under other state laws or under agreements with – and completely financed by  
– the Treasury  (such as income support, alimony, old-age and survivors to new 
immigrants and reserve service benefits) decreased in real terms by 9%.  The sum of 
non-contributory payments amounted to about NIS 9.45 billion in 2003, constituting 
some 21% of total benefit payments (as compared to 22.4% in 2002). 
 
Diagram B presents the distribution of benefit payments by branch. There was a 
decrease in 2003 in the share of the children, unemployment and income support 
branches in total payments,  as well as in the share of reserve service benefits, and a 
parallel increase in the share of other branches, especially of the two largest branches, 
old-age and survivors and general disability. 
 
 
Table 2:  Benefit Payments and Collection from the Public (percentages relative      
                to the Gross Domestic Product), 1980-2003 
 
Benefit Payments  Collection from the Public 
Year 
Total   Contributory 




      
1980  6.09  4.98 6.77 5.15 
1985  7.14  5.51 6.57 4.45 
1990  8.36  7.04 7.21 5.28 
1991  7.41  6.14 6.75 5.00 
1992  7.40  5.99 5.84 4.93 
1993  7.77  6.28 6.96 5.11 
1994  8.01  6.62 7.07 5.19 
1995  7.69  6.02 8.02 4.49 
1998  8.46  6.80 6.52 4.45 
1999  8.40  6.73 6.48 4.42 
2000  8.48  6.75 6.65 4.52 
2001  9.62  7.56 7.07 4.79 
2002  9.42  7.32 6.92 4.70 
2003 8.88  7/02  6.81  4.60 
*      Including collection for the sick funds. 
** Including  Treasury indemnification for the reduction of national insurance contributions of employers. 
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1.5 Benefit  Level 
 
There was real erosion in the level of all benefits paid by the NII in 2002-2003, 
whether as a result of government policy or of the erosion in wages. During these 
years the basic old-age pension lost about 10% of its purchasing power, while the 
pensions paid to survivors and to elderly persons entitled to income supplement (not 
reduced by 4% in 2002) eroded by a lower rate – about 6% – in real terms.  Due to the 
erosion of about 10% in real wages, there was no change in the level of the basic old-
age pension relative to the average wage, while the minimum income guaranteed to 
the elderly and survivors even rose in terms of wages. 
 
The maximum amounts of the income support benefit were highly eroded in real 
terms; for example, the benefit to a single person (under age 55) entitled to the 
increased rate was eroded by 15%, the benefit for a single parent with two children 
plus child allowances was eroded by about 28%, and the benefit to a couple with two 
children – by about 21%. The average benefit to a family declined between 2001-2003 
by 20% in real terms. 
 
Table 3: The  Old-Age  and   Survivors'  Pension  and  the  Minimum  Income                 
Guaranteed to Pension Recipients (constant prices and percentage of                 
average wage*), Monthly Average, 1975-2003 
 
 
Basic old-age & survivors’ pension 
Guaranteed minimum income 
 (including child allowances) 
Single elder  Widow/er with 2 
children  Single elder  Widow/er with 2 

























              
1975 618.5 14.9  1,027.3  24.8  1,061.8  25.5  1,997.2  48.1 
1980 679.9 13.5  1,317.8  26.3  1,183.3  23.8  2,420.8  48.2 
1985 768.1 15.2  1,487.7  29.5  1,535.0  30.5  3,070.8  61.2 
1990 967.1 15.9  1.870.6  30.7  1,517.8  25.0  3,077.7  50.5 
1995 978.9 15.5  1,897.5  30.1  1,638.3  26.0  3,397.0  53.9 
2000 1.093.4  14.9  2,116.9  28.8  1,826.6  24.9  4,018.8  54.7 
2001 1,185.3  15.8  2,296.1  30.5  1,982.2  26.3  4,344.3  57.7 
2002 1,101.8  15.6  2,177.8  30.8  1,879.9  26.6  3,996.5  56.4 
2003 1,114.0  16.2  2,158.0  31.4  1,863.0  27.1  4,031.3  58.7 
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The child allowance was highly eroded as well; the allowance to a family with two 
children was eroded by about 20% in 2002-2003, and the allowance to a family with 
four children – by about 27%. 
 
The average daily unemployment benefit was eroded in real terms by 6%, due to the 
erosion in wages between 2001-2003.  On the other hand, it rose a little relative to the 
average wage, due to the higher wage level of the unemployed persons just prior to 
their unemployment.  In 2002-2003 there was a rise in the share of academics and 
veteran workers in the unemployment population as compared to previous years.  This 
population earned higher wages, entitling them to higher unemployment benefits. 
 
Table 5: Child-Allowance  Point  and  Child  Allowances* (constant  prices and                  




Allowance for 2 
children** 
Allowance for 4 
children 




























1975   182   4.4   365   8.8  1,140  27.4  1,550  37.3  
1980  142  2.8  284  5.6  887  17.7  1,205  24.0  
1985  161  3.1  182  3.6  1,244  24.7  1,767  35.1  
1990  186  2.9  89  1.5  1,441  23.4  2,044  33.2  
1995  181  2.8  361  5.8  1,452  23.4  2,065  33.4  
2000  184  2.5  368  5.0  1,482  20.2  2,109  28.7  
2001   182  2.4  364  4.8  1,468  19.5  2,379  31.6  
2002   173   2.4   307   4.3   1,229   17.3  1,992  28.1  
2003   171   2.5   290   4.2  1,071  15.6  1,711  24.9  
*     Including Special Allowance for Veterans. 
**   As measured by the Central Bureau of Statistics. 
*** The allowance level in 1985-1993 relates to a family (up to 3 children) not eligible for the first child 
allowance, and since October 1990 – for the second child allowance as well. In March 1993 the 
payment of child allowance on a universal basis was renewed. 
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1.6   Benefit Recipients 
 
In 2002-2003, there was a slowdown in the growth in the number of benefit recipients 
in most branches, and a sharp decline in the number of recipients of unemployment 
benefits and work injury allowance.  In comparison with previous years, the slowdown 
was particularly notable in income support, while the numbers of recipients of child 
allowance and long-term care benefit barely changed.  In some branches, the 
developments result from the legislative changes introduced in 2002-2003 or 
previously, or from changes in work procedures; in other branches, they can be 
explained by demographic factors or by the diminishing influence of the recession. 
 
In old-age and survivors, the largest national insurance branch, the number of 
recipients grew by 2.3% in each of the years 2002-2003, as compared to an average of 
about 3.4% in each of the five previous years.  In 2003 the NII paid benefits to about 
700,000 elderly persons and survivors.  The slowdown in the growth in the number of 
recipients stems only from the decrease in the scope of immigration to the country; the 
numbers of recipients of special old-age & survivors pensions declined by 1.4% in 
2002 and by 3.9% in 2003. A significant slowdown occurred too in the growth of the 
number of recipients in the long-term care branch, providing in-kind benefits to 
elderly persons limited in their daily functioning – from 10% in 2001 (a similar rate 
for the previous five years) to 6.5% in 2002 and to about 1% only in 2003.  An 
analysis of the entries to and exits from the system shows that the steep decline in the 
pace of growth stems from a decrease in the number of entrants (about 15%) and a 
decline in the rate of claims approved.  In 2003, the number of claims for long-term 
care benefit declined unexpectedly (10%) for the first time in 12 years, mainly due to 
the decrease in the number of first-time claims. The rate of approved claims went 
down from about 49% in 2001 to about 43% in 2003.  This development apparently 
stems from administrative and organizational changes. 
 
In the children branch, a slowdown occurred for the third straight year in the number 
of families receiving child allowances. Following an average growth of 23% in 1997-
200 (in keeping with the natural growth of the population), the growth rate went down 
in 2001-2003 from 1.7% to 0.4%. The number of children for whom allowance was 
paid went up by only 1% in each of the years 2001-2003, reaching about 2.18 million 
children living in about 940,000 families in 2003.  It is not clear to what extent this 
trend is due to demographic factors or to more thorough examinations of entitlement 
of persons residing abroad, or persons not defined as residents, to child allowance. 
 
In the general disability branch, the growth in the number of recipients of the general 
disability pensions remained more or less stable in 2001-2003; it rose by about 5%-
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1991-1995. There was a marked slowdown in the growth in the numbers of recipients 
of attendance allowance and mobility benefit, after sharp rises following the 
implementation of the legislation expanding coverage in 1999. 
 
Regarding wage-replacing benefits, the decline in the number of recipients of injury 
allowance was sharply renewed in 2003 by 12%, continuing the trend that 
characterized 1997-2002.  The number of recipients of injury allowance as a monthly 
average went down from about 92,8000 in 1996 to about 61,000 in 2003: an 
accumulated decline of about 33%. The rate of recipients of injury allowance out of 
total employees decreased from 4.3% in 1996 to 2.6% in 2003.  This downward trend 
began with the cancellation of payment of injury allowance by the NII, for the first 
nine days, and continued with the shortening of the maximum period for payment of 
injury allowance from 182 days to 91 days. The recession in employment – and 
particularly in high-risk branches from the point of view of work injury, such as 
construction, agriculture and industry – also contributed to the trend of decline in the 
number of injury allowance recipients.  However, the number of recipients of work 
disability pension rose by an average of 5% a year in 2001-2003, reaching about 
23,000 in 2003. 
 
The legislative changes led to a sharp fall – of about a third – in the number of 
recipients of unemployment benefit, from about 105,000 as a monthly average in 2001 
to about 70,000 in 2003.  This occurred despite the expansion of unemployment in 
those years.  It is surmised that had it not been for the legislative changes, the number 
of recipients of unemployment benefits would have shot up to about 120,000 a month. 
 
The number of women receiving maternity allowances also decreased in 2001-2002; 
in both years together this number grew by only 1%. On the other hand, the number of 
recipients went up in 2003 by 3.5%.  The slowdown in employment in the past three 
years and the expansion of unemployment slowed down the growth in the number of 
employed women, and, therefore, also of the number of women entitled to maternity 
allowance. 
 
Finally, the trend characterizing many branches did not pass over the income support 
system for the working-age population.  Already in 2001-2002, even before the 
changes in the Income Support Law came into effect, the rate of growth in the number 
of income support recipients declined from about 13% in 1998-2000 to about 10.5% in 
2001 and to about 6.5% in 2002.  The amendments implemented in June 2003 ruled 
out benefits to about 4,500 families and made entry of new recipients difficult.  
 
In 2003, a monthly average of about 155,000 families received income support, as 
compared to 151,000 in 2002: a rise of only 2.6%.  It should be noted that the work Trends of Development in National Insurance   27 E  
 
sanctions that took place towards the end of 2003 and the changes introduced in the 
employment test contributed to the slowdown in the growth of number of income 
support recipients.  This conjecture is strengthened by the rise in the number of claims 




1.7   Collection of Insurance Contributions from the Public and the  
        Sources of Financing Benefits 
 
The NII benefit payments are financed from four sources: collection of national 
insurance contributions (direct collection from the public as well as Treasury 
indemnification against the reduction in employer and self-employed contribution 
rates); government participation in the financing of contributory benefits; and receipts 
from interest in investments of surpluses in government bonds.  In addition to 
collection of national insurance contributions, the NII collects health insurance 
contributions and transfers them to the sick funds. 
 
Many changes were introduced into the collection system of the NII in the years 2002-
2003 – whether as temporary orders or as permanent amendments.  During these years 
the government policy was to increase the burden of insurance contribution payments 
on the workers and employees, while lowering its own participation (indemnification) 
in these payments, with the aim of reducing the deficit in the state budget.  The 
government preferred to increase the tax burden by means of national insurance 
contributions, even temporarily, so as not to interfere with the implementation of the 
income tax reform.  Moreover, the changes in the benefit system and the adjustment 
methods affected the scope of collection by means of the NII as well as the 
government participation in financing both contributory and non-contributory benefits. 
 
 
1.7.1  Collection of Insurance Contributions from the Public 
  
Total collection from the public for national insurance branches and for the health 
system in 2002-2003 was influenced by the recession and by the government policy of 
raising the tax burden by means of national insurance and health insurance 
contributions.  This policy – even if parts of it were only temporary – was actually in 
opposition to the government policy of easing the tax burden, as expressed in the 
recommendations of the Rabinowitz Committee for Income Tax Reform. 
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Box 8 presents the legislative changes in the NII collection system in 2002-2003, 
including those enacted under the Economic Policy Law of 2004.  The two central 
changes that influenced the scope of collection during these years were the 
cancellation of the income ceiling liable for national insurance contribution rate and 
the raising by one percentage point of the national insurance contributions imposed on 
employers and self-employed. The former change was determined at first as a 
temporary order for July 2002-December 2003, but the ceiling was returned to a level 
of five times the average wage before the temporary order expired – in June 2003. The 
aim of this policy was to reduce the deficit in the state budget.  Increasing the 
insurance contribution burden, particularly by canceling the ceiling, was criticized in 
several quarters, including within the Treasury. 
 
The Minister of Finance at the time, Silvan Shalom, justified his policy on the basis of 
considerations of income distribution; when benefits to the weak population groups 
and the child allowances are sharply reduced, a more equitable distribution of the 
burden arising from the reduction in the state budget requires heavier taxation of the 
more affluent sectors.  The NII supported the raising of contribution rates imposed on 
employers and self-employed persons as a source of reducing the budget, mainly in 
view of the significant lowering of these rates since the ‘80’s and out of concern that 
the alternative to increasing the burden of contributions would be an additional cut in 
benefits.  On the other hand, the NII opposed canceling the ceiling, even on a 
temporary basis.  The NII believed that in view of the cuts in benefits to the weak 
population groups, the tax burden on the higher-income employees and self-employed 
should be increased; however, it claimed that this increase should be carried out by 
raising the income tax rate, not by canceling the ceiling.  Two reasons were given for 
this stand; the first, the fact that in every social security system, the income liable for 
insurance contributions has a ceiling; and the second, the concern that the gap that 
would be created between the taxation of individuals and that of companies would 
motivate individuals to organize themselves as companies in order to evade the 
additional tax burden. The NII estimated that this change in behavior would lead to a 
loss of about 15% of the collection potential stemming from the cancellation of the 
ceiling.  Looking back, it is clear that the NII was correct; a relatively small 
percentage of individuals having an income level above the ceiling indeed organized 
themselves as companies.  Those who wanted the ceiling restored invested great 
efforts in giving the impression (in the public and in media) that its cancellation led to 
the creation of tens of thousands of companies – even when the NII and the State 
Income Administration contended that the scope of collection did not exceed the 
estimates that had been presented during discussion of the new legislation.   
 
According to the data of the company register for June 2002-March 2003, about 4,400 
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companies. These constitute about 11% out of the approximately 40,000 individuals 
whose income was above the ceiling (about NIS 35,000 a month) before this policy 
was implemented. 
 
There is no doubt that the persuasion campaign of the “wealthy” succeeded, since the 
government decided to restore the ceiling even before the temporary order expired.  
The loss of collection stemming from the restoration of the ceiling – about NIS 1.6 
billion annually – created a deficit in the state budget and was followed by an 
additional cut in government expenditure and in NII benefits. 
 
The restoration of the ceiling was only the first step in the Treasury’s policy of easing 
the burden of national insurance contributions on the higher-income employees and 
self-employed persons.  In the framework of the overall policy of easing the burden of 
tax on income from work – and as part of the income tax reform – the government 
decided to cancel the linkage of the income ceiling liable for insurance contributions 
to changes in the average wage, and to adapt its level to price fluctuations  only.  
 
The efforts of the NII to ease the burden of national insurance contributions on low-
wage earners were successful in July 2002.  In discussions on a private bill regarding 
the contributions imposed on kibbutzim (collective settlements), the NII proposed a 
universal change to apply to all low and middle-wage earners, and not only to the 
kibbutzim.  Under this proposal, anchored in an amendment (No. 50) to the NII Law, 
the reduced rate for employees was lowered to 1.4% of the income liable for 
contributions and in parallel, the regular rate was raised to 5.58% – without changing 
the scope of collection.  All employees with income of up to one and a half the 
average wage benefited from a reduction in contribution payments, while all other 
employees had to pay more. The reduction in contributions was particularly significant 
for the low-wage earners – those whose income was up to half the average wage. 
 
The government policy of increasing the burden of  contributions was reflected in 
additional amendments, actually aimed at correcting distortions in the system.  Work 
injured were obligated to pay national insurance contributions on their injury 
allowance, which constitutes a replacement of their wages, similarly to other wage-
replacing benefits; the health insurance contributions imposed on soldiers in the 
standing army were equalized to the rate deducted from employees’ wages: recipients 
of early pensions were obligated to pay national and health insurance contributions on 
their full pension, at the rates imposed on employees (except for unemployment), with 
the aim of discouraging early retirement
2  The last change, implemented in 2004,  
                                                      
2 It is more complex to relate to pensions as wages for purposes of income contributions,   
especially with regard to disability pensions.  E30  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
 
benefited recipients of  pensions up to the average wage, who will pay lower 
contributions, while the remainder will be obligated to pay more – sometimes much 
more.  At the same time, it should be recalled that the government increased the tax 
burden on recipients of early pension (cancellation of the 35% exemption for income 
tax purposes) and on recipients of pension from the veteran funds (obligation of 2% as 
payment of administrative fees). 
 
The policy of increasing the contribution burden was applied to the weak population 
groups as well, although in their case it has not yet been implemented.  An amendment 
proposed in June 2003, but not yet implemented, obligates housewives, previously 
exempt from health insurance contributions, to pay these contributions of an amount 
of NIS 70 monthly.   Data presented by the NII show that about 70% of housewives 
are in the lower five income deciles and that many housewives – or their husbands – 
receive NII benefits, such as unemployment, general disability or income support.  
However, collection of health contributions from housewives required resources from 
the NII that were not available.  Furthermore, the Finance Committee of the Knesset 
set up a sub-committee to examine the changes in the contribution amounts to be 
imposed on certain groups of housewives (including an exemption from payment), to 
achieve the Treasury’s aim of higher total collection.  The committee discussions 
focused on an alternative to the law that was passed (in the framework of the credit 
point allotted to workers for non-working spouses) but not yet completed. 
 
The cancellation of the ceiling in July 2002, its restoration in July 2003 and the raising 
of the contributions imposed on employers and self-employed persons in July 2003 
(for an unlimited period of time) are the two amendments that affected collection from 
the public during the years 2002-2003
3  – although the raising of the health 
contributions imposed on soldiers in the standing army was also partially expressed in 
2003 collection.  The other changes will be reflected in the collection of 2004 and 
beyond.  Of course, collection from the public was also affected by economic 
developments, particularly in the areas of wages and employment.  During those two 
years wages were eroded by about 10% in real terms (by about 6.5% in 2002 and 
about 3% in 2003), while the number of employees grew by about 0.9% only in 2002 
and 2% in 2003.  There has been no change in the number of employee posts since 
2001.  The economic recession was also expressed in collection from self-employed 
and other non-employee insured. 
 
                                                      
3 The raising of contributions imposed on employees and the self-employed persons influenced 
collection for five months in 2002, but for all of 2003.  On the other hand, cancellation of the 
ceiling influenced collection for five months in 2002 and for seven months in 2003. Trends of Development in National Insurance   31 E  
 
The potential for additional collection of national and health insurance contributions 
from the public stemming from the removal of the ceiling was estimated as 
approximately NIS 1.8 billion for a full year.  However, even at the time of the 
estimations, it was assumed that the collection would amount to about 85% of the 
potential  – some NIS 1.55 billion.  The potential for additional collection from 
employers and self-employed persons was estimated as about NIS 2.1 annually; and 
after deducting the influences of the change in individual behavior (becoming 
companies) – about NIS 1.9 billion.  On the basis of these estimates, and taking into 
account the number of months in 2002-2003 for which the amendments affected 
collection, the NII was meant to collect about NIS 1.45 billion as a result of the 
amendments.  The data of Table 7 show that in 2002, the NII collected a sum of about 
NIS 31.4 billion from the public – a growth of about 5.6% in nominal terms as 
compared to 2001.  Not taking the amendments into account, the growth would have 
been 0.7% – only slightly higher than that observed, considering the fact that the 
volume of wages did not increase between 2001 and 2002.  The scope of collection 
did not change in real terms between 2001 and 2002, but were it not for the 
amendments, it would have declined by 4.8%.  
 
These data show that the estimates presented by the NII on the influence of the 
legislation in collection from the public were verified, and they disprove the claim that 
the removal of the ceiling did not increase state income from taxes. 
 
The table presents a similar analysis for 2003.  It should be recalled that the potential 
of additional collection in 2003 resulting from the amendments was lower than in 
2002; the volume of income above the ceiling not liable for contributions decreased in 
2002 due to the establishment of the companies, and in 2003 the erosion in minimum 
wages continued.  Furthermore, the influence of the recession on the income of  self-
employed persons became even stronger in 2003.  In that year the NII collected a sum 
of NIS 32.3 billion – a nominal growth of 2.8% and a real growth of 2.2%.  Were it 
not for the amendments, collection from the public would have decreased by 2.4%.  It 
should be stressed that the influence of the legislation in 2003 included the additional 
collection resulting from the raising of the health contributions imposed on soldiers in 
the standing army. 
 
Table 7 shows that the scope of collection from the public by means of the NII 
continued to grow in 2003 in relation to the GDP, reaching 6.5% as compared to 6.3% 
in 2001 and 5.9% in 2000. The trend of growth in the share of collection from the 
public out of total direct taxes collected from individual also continued, reaching 
38.8% in 2003 as compared to 35.8% in 2001. The weight of the national insurance 
contributions out of total collection from the public went up from 64.7% to 66.2%, E32  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
 
due to the differences in the influence of the legislation on collection of national and 
health insurance contributions. 
 
Table 7: Collection for National Insurance Institute & Health System 1999-2003 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
       
In Current Prices (NIS Million) 
       
Total receipts from 
contributions 
27,412 30,511 32,814 33,995 33,653 
Total collection from public  24,771  27,655  29,724  31,378  32,268 
For nat’l insurance branches  16,045  17,893  19,147  20,595  21,364 
For health system  8,726  9,762  10,577  10,883  10,904 
Total Treasury 
indemnification 
2,641 2,856 3,090 2,617 1,385 
       
Indicators of development of collection from the public 
A. Percentage of real change 
 
Total collection from public  4.4  10.4  6.3  -0.1  2.2 
For nat’l insurance branches  4.1  10.3  5.8  1.3  3.5 
For health system  4.9  10.7  7.2  -2.7  -0.5 
 
B. As percentage of GDP 
 
Total collection from public  5.8  5.9  6.3  6.4  6.5 
For nat’l insurance branches  3.7  3.8  4.0  4.2  4.3 
For health system  2.0  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.2 
 
C. As percentage of direct taxes to individuals 
 
Total collection from public  35.8  35.1  35.8  37.8  38.8 
For nat’l insurance branches  23.2  22.7  23.0  24.7  25.7 
For health system  12.6  12.4  12.7  13.1  13.1 
 
D. As percentage of direct taxes 
 
Total collection from public  29.1  27.0  28.3  30.8  32.5 
For nat’l insurance branches  18.9  17.5  18.2  20.1  21.5 
For health system  10.3  9.5  10.1  10.7  11.0 Trends of Development in National Insurance   33 E  
 
1.7.2  Sources of Financing Benefits 
 
Total NII receipts for financing its branches amounted in 2003 to about NIS 47.9 
billion, in current terms.  As compared to 2002, financing sources went down by 2.3% 
in real terms.  Receipts from national insurance contributions (collection from the 
public and Treasury indemnification) declined in real terms by 2.3%, while 
government participation in the finance of contributory benefits – amounting to about 
NIS 10.8 billion – rose by 2%.  Since government participation in the finance of 
contributory benefits (under article 32 of the NI Law) stems from the scope of 
collection of contributions from the public, the former should have declined at the 
same rate as the latter.  However, in 2003, the government also transferred its debts 
from the previous year to the NII.  Government financing of non-contributory benefits 
– amounting to about NIS 9.45 billion in 2003  –  decreased sharply in real terms: by  
 























NIS (current prices) 
        
1995 23,581  12,171  4,222  4,650  2,507 
2000 41,207  20,751  8,336  8,148  3,907 
2001 46,110  22,237  9,952  9,756  4,075 
2002  48,659 23,112 10,520  10,594  4,266 
2003  47,912 22,749 10,802  9,453  4,500 
        
Real annual growth (percentages) 
        
2000  7.6 9.8 1.6  10.8 3.6 
2001 10.7  6.0  18.1  18.4  3.2 
2002 -0.2  -1.7  0.0  2.7  -1.0 
2003 -2.2  -2.3  2.0  -11.4  4.8 
        
Distribution (percentages) 
        
1995  100.0 51.6 17.9  19.7 10.6 
2000  100.0 50.4 20.2  19.8  9.5 
2001  100.0 48.2 21.6  21.2  8.8 
2002  100.0 47.5 21.6  21.8  8.8 
2003  100.0 47.5 22.5  19.7  9.4 E34  Trends of Development in National Insurance 
 
11.4%.  This decrease stems from the cuts in benefits, particularly in the income 
support and alimony benefits paid by the NII, and from the decline in the scope of 
payments of the reserve service benefit. 
 
NII receipts from interest on its investments amounted to about 4.5%, and they rose by 
about 4.8% in real terms, as compared to 2002. 
 
An examination of the distribution of benefit finance by source of finance shows that 
the share of receipts from insurance contributions remained without change – 47.5% 
of total sources. 
 
The share of the government participation in the financing of the contributory benefits 
rose from 21.6% in 2002 to 22.6% in 2003, but its share in the financing of the non-
contributory benefits fell from 21.8% to 19.7%, respectively.  The share of receipts 
from interest rose from 8.8% to 9.4%.  
 
 
1.7.3  Surpluses/Deficits & Financial Reserves 
 
The government policy in 2002-2003 was reflected in the shrinking of the current 
deficit in NII activities.  A budgetary examination of NII branches shows that if 
income from interest in NII investments is not taken into account, the deficit was 
reduced by about 2 billion shekels – from about NIS 3.5 billion in 2001 to about NIS 
1.5 billion in 2003.  This development is in contrast to the trend of increase in the 
deficit that had characterized the NII since 1995.  The decline of the current deficit in 
the past two years was particularly notable in the work injury and unemployment 
branches, while the current surplus in the children branch rose by about 2.4 billion. 
 
On the other hand, the growth in the current deficit continued in the other branches, 
particularly in the disability branch in which expenditure grew as a result of the 
favorable legislation enacted following the strikes of the disabled population.  The 
deficit in this branch grew by about NIS 1.2 billion between 2001 and 2003. 
 
The improvement in the NII’s financial situation is also expressed by taking into 
consideration income from interest on past surpluses. Total surpluses, including 
interest, went up by about NIS 2.3 billion in current terms, reaching about NIS 3 
billion in 2003.  
 
The branches in deficit are general disability, unemployment and long-term care.  The 
assets of the unemployment branch ran out since 1999, and it is being financed 
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Table 9:  Surpluses/Deficit in National Insurance Branches, 2001-2002 
 
Surplus/Deficit Without Interest 
on Investments 
Surplus/Deficit Including 
Interest on Investments  Insurance Branch 
2001  2002  2003  2001  2002  2003 
 
NIS million (current prices) 
 
Total -3,446  -2,896  -1,526  629  1,370  2,974  
Old-age & survivors  -643  -316  -930  1,023  1,490  1,010  
General disability  -1,782  -2,504  -2,962  -936  -1,694  -2,202  
Work injury  -1,196  -1,221  -897  -829  -891  -587  
Maternity -864  -897  -940  -692  -757  -830  
Children 5,335  6,493  7,737  5,890  7,243  8,717  
Unemployment -3,080  -?  2,076  -3,080  -3,113  -2,076  
Long-term care  -1,402  -1,496  -1,522  -1,045  -1,191  -1,262  
Other 186  158  64  298  283  204  
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Diagram A: The National Insurance Institute - Resources and Uses
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Box 1 
I.  Adjustment of Benefits and Cancellation of Linkage to Average 
Wage 
 
Economy Arrangements Law-2002  
*  January 2002 cancellation of 1.2% adjustment of those benefits linked to average 
wage –  benefits determined in law as percentages of the average wage (old-age 
and  survivors,  income  support  and  alimony).  This  measure  was  carried  out  by 
freezing the average wage at its 2001 level (NIS 6,964 per month, as compared to 
NIS 7,500 in January 2002.) 
*  Cancellation of 1.4% adjustment of child allowances.  The value of a full credit point 
was reduced from NIS 174 per month to its 2001 rate of NIS 171 per month. 
*  Cancellation  of  adjustment  of  benefits  was  anchored  in  a  temporary  order  for 
March-December 2002. 
 
Emergency Economy Law-July 2002  
*  Extension  of  temporary  order  regarding  non-adjustment  of  benefits  to  additional 
benefits in General Disability, Long-term Care, Work Injury and maternity allowance. 
Were it not for the amendment, all benefits linked in one way or another to the 
average wage would have been updated by 0.9% in 2003, and child allowances – 
by 6.5%. This temporary order was meant to extend until the end of 2003. 
 
Economy Recovery Law-June 2003 
*  Extension of temporary order regarding non-adjustment of most benefits linked to 
the  average  wage  as  well  as  child  allowances,  until  the  end  of  2005.    Benefit 
recipients  will  not  be  compensated  for  non-adjustment  of  these  benefits  upon 
renewal of the adjustment process in early 2006.  
*   Cancellation of linkage of benefits to average wage and their adjustment to price 
rises only, as of 2006.  From 2006, all benefits will be expressed in terms of a “basic 
amount” adjusted in accordance with price rises. 
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Two exceptions were determined in the law: 
a)  Benefits in Old-age and Survivors and the dependents’ benefits in Work Injury will 
be adjusted in accordance with price rises as of January 2004. 
b)  Benefits will be adjusted in 2004-2005 only if the index goes up by at least 5% a 
year. 
*    The  replacement  of  the  “average  wage”  by  the  “basic  amount”  affects  wage-
replacing benefits (such as unemployment benefit, injury allowance and maternity 
allowance) as well.  The maximum sums for payment of injury allowance, maternity 
allowance and reserve service allowance will be increased at the rate of the price 
rise,  as  will  the  wage  scales  in  the  calculation  of  the  unemployment  benefit.  
However, the level of the latter benefit will still be limited by the rate of the average 
wage (or 2/3 of this wage), as to be calculated from time to time. 
*    Freezing of linkage of the minimum wage to changes in the average wage in 2003-
2005 (but not to the cost-of-living increment).  As of 2005, the minimum wage will 
be linked to the average wage, as was the case up to March 2002. 
 
II.  Lateral Reduction in Benefit Rates 
 
Emergency Economy Law-2002 
*  4% reduction in almost all benefits, as a temporary order for July 2002- December 
2003.    The  following  benefits  were  not  reduced:  general  disability,  survivors, 
dependents in work injury and old-age pensions to recipients of income supplement. 
 
Economy Recovery Law-June 2003 
*  Extension of temporary order regarding the 4% reduction of benefits until the end 
of  2006.  This  reduction  shall  not  apply  to  disability  benefits  as  a  result  of  work 
injury. 
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Box 2 
Changes in Unemployment Insurance  
 
Emergency Economy Law-July 2002  
*  Extension of qualifying period for unemployment benefit and reduction of period out 
of which this period may be accumulated.  Only unemployed persons who worked at 
least 360 days out of the 540 days preceding their unemployment are entitled to 
benefit, as compared to 180 days out of 360 or 270 days out of 540 before the 
amendment. 
*  Reduction of maximum period for entitlement to unemployment benefit for persons 
under 25, from 100 days to 150 days.  
*  30% reduction in rate of unemployment benefits paid to participants in vocational 
training.  
 
Economy Arrangements Law-2003 
*  Payment of unemployment benefits to participants in vocational training restricted 
to the maximum period of entitlement to benefit. 
 
Economy Recovery Law-June 2003 
*  Unemployment benefit to participants in vocational training who have less than 12 
years of schooling will be paid for a period of 138 days, even if the participant is 
entitled to a maximum period of 50 or 100 days. 
*  Entitlement to unemployment benefits denied to controlling shareholders who work 
in their companies as well as to students who are not available for work due to their 
studies. 
*  The  formula  for  calculating  unemployment  benefits  was  amended,  to  a  uniform 
formula for those having incomes lower or higher than the average wage. 
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Box 3 




Economy Arrangements Law-2002  
*  12% reduction in child allowances to all families for all children, as temporary order 
for March-December 2002 – carried out by decreasing the number of credit points 
per family, in accordance with its size (on the basis of 0.88 of a credit point instead 
of a full credit point – NIS 151 instead of NIS 171 per month). 
 
Emergency Economy Law-2002 (July) 
*  The rate of reduction of child allowances was raised to 15% for all children and in 
all  families  (according  to  0.85  of  a  credit  point,  or  NIS  146  per  month)  as  a 
temporary order until the end of 2003. 
*  Reduction of child allowance to families of 3 or more children, in which one of the 
members (parents or their children) did not serve in one of the security forces. This 
reduction was not carried out due to a petition to the court, and was later cancelled 
altogether under Economy Recovery Law of June 2003. 
 
Economy Recovery Law-June 2003 
*  A  plan  to  gradually  (in  7  stages)  reduce  child  allowances  from  August  2003  to 
January 2009, when a uniform allowance of NIS 144 (0.84 of a credit point) will be 
paid for every child, regardless of his/her place in the family. 
*  For “new” children (born in June 2003 or thereafter) a uniform allowance (NIS 144) 
will be paid, regardless of his/her place in the family. 
 
Economic Policy Law for Fiscal Year 2004 
*  Child allowances will be reduced by NIS 24 for every child during February-June 
2004.  This reduction will continue for the first three children until the end of 2005, 
while for the fourth and subsequent children, there will be a reduction of NIS 5 
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during  July  2004-December  2005.    This  reduction  is  in  addition  to  the  previous 
graded reductions, and does not replace it. 
*  For every “new” child, born in February 2004, an allowance of NIS 120 will be paid 
until December 2005. 
*  The second stage of the graded reduction under the Economy Recovery Law will be 
postponed from January 2004 to July 2004. 
*  As of July 2004, families with 3 or more children who receive income support will 
receive an increment to their child allowance: 0.59 of a credit point (NIS 101) per 




Economy Recovery Law-June 2003 
*  Reduction of maternity grant paid for second and subsequent children in families, 
from 20% to 6% of average wage, and reduction of the grant paid for the fifth and 
subsequent  children  in  families,  from  40%  to  6%  of  the  average  wage.  The 
maternity grant for the first child remained at a level of 20% of the average wage. 
 
Economic Policy for Fiscal Year 2004 
*  Raising of maternity grant for second child in families only, from 6% to 9% of the 
average wage. 
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Box 4 
Changes in Income Support and Alimony Insurance 
 
I. In NII Benefits 
 
Economy Arrangements Law–2002 
*  Cancellation  of  income  support  benefit  at  increased  rate  to  those  entitled  after 
received benefit at regular rate for 24 months, whether consecutive or not.  (At that 
time the regular rate had been about 20% lower than the increased rate.)  The 
change was implemented in April 2002. 
*  Taking  the  full  amount  of  unemployment  benefit  into  account  for  purposes  of 
determining  entitlement  to  income  supplement  and  its  level.    Prior  to  this 
amendment, unemployment benefits were deducted by a sum equivalent to 13% or 
17% of the average wage, according to family composition.  
 
Economy Arrangements Law–2003 
*  Reduction  of  maximum  amounts  of  income  support  benefit  at  both  regular  and 
increased rates, by8% to 23%, depending on family composition. 
*  Cancellation of income support benefit at increased rate to claimants aged 46-54.  
This  change  applies  to  “new”  claimants  only  (who  begin  receiving  benefits  in 
January 2003 or thereafter, either for the first time or after a 6-month break. 
*  An additional reduction of income support benefit paid to single claimants under 25 
and to couples without children, one of whom is under 25, with a few exceptions 
(persons unable to work for health reasons). The benefit paid to young claimants is 
at the rate of 80% of the new maximum amounts determined in this law. 
*  Reduction of amount of income from work not taken into account (disregard) for 
purposes of determining entitlement to income supplement and its level – from 13% 
to 5% of the average wage for a single person, and from 17% to 7% of the average 
wage for other family compositions. 
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*  Determination of rate of set-off against income from work that is higher than the 
income not taken into account, at a level ranging from 60% to 70%, according to 
family composition. 
*  Cancellation  of  “determining  sums”;  the  level  of  income  from  work  ruling  out 
entitlement  to  benefit  is  deduced  from  the  new  sums  of  income  not  taken  into 
account  and  from  the  new  set-off  rates.  For  most  family  compositions,  and 
particularly  for  single-parent  families,  the  income  level  ruling  out  benefit  was 
lowered, leading to the ruling out of entitlement to benefit to some families who 
would otherwise have been entitled, or could be entitled in the future. 
*  The changes in the level of benefit and in the structure of the income test apply also 
to women entitled to alimony from the NII. 
*  All the above changes – reduction in maximum amounts of benefit and changes in 
parameters of income test – do not apply to single claimants aged 55 or over, nor to 
families in which at least one of the spouses is over 55. 
*  Cancellation  of  exemption  from  employment  test  (reporting  to  the  employment 
bureau) for mothers of children aged 2 to 7; that is, only mothers of children up to 
age 2 will continue to b exempt from the employment test.  The exemption was also 
cancelled  for  widows  receiving  survivors’  pension  or  income  supplement.  These 
widows had been exempt from the employment test regardless of the age of their 
children.  The exemption will continue to be in effect for single parents entitled to 
alimony, regardless of the age of their children.  
*  Cancellation of the situation entitling to benefit, “a person unsuitable for placement 
at any job”, with a few exceptions.  The labor exchange is no longer permitted to 
exempt  recipients  of  income  support  benefit  from  reporting  regularly  to  the 
exchange  –  except  for  persons  aged  55  or  over,  who  at  the  time  of  the  law’s 
enactment were classified as “persons permanently unsuitable for placement at any 
job.” 
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II. In Other Systems 
 
Economy  Arrangements  Law-2003,  Economy  Recovery  Law-June  2003  and 
Government Decisions 
*  Cancellation  of  automatic  70%  discount  on  municipal  tax  to  new  recipients  of 
income support benefit: those entitled to benefit on January 1, 2003 or who were 
previously entitled and became re-entitled after 6 months elapsed since payment of 
benefit  ceased.  These  new  recipients  will  be  entitled  to  discount  according  to  a 
means  test  specified  in  the  relevant  regulations  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior.  
Those  aged  50  or  over  who  began  receiving  benefit  after  January  1,  2003  will 
continue to receive a 70% discount, but only in 2004. These rules apply to women 
receiving alimony benefits from the NII as well. 
*  Cancellation of discount in public transportation to new recipients of income support 
and alimony, as of January 1, 2003.  
*  4% reduction in rental assistance, and 40%-50% reduction in this assistance to new 
recipients under 55. Lower rates of reduction to those aged 55 or over. In addition, 
a  5%  annual  reduction  from  the  fourth  year  onward  to  those  who  received 
assistance for three years. In 2004, an additional 7% cut was determined in rental 
assistance. These reductions are anchored in government decisions.  
*  Cancellation of exemption of new recipients from TV fee. The required regulations 
for  this  measure  have  not  yet  been  signed  by  the  Minister  of  Industry  and 
Commerce.  
*  Cancellation  of  discount  in  payments  for  doctors’  visits  (amendment  of  National 
Health Law). 
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Box 5 




Amendment to N.I. Law 54 – Coming into effect in March 2002 
*  Payment  of  a  new  pension  (in  addition  to  disability  pension)  to  persons  with  a 
disability degree of at least 50% and medical disability of at least 75%. The rate of 
this “additional monthly pension” rises with the increase in medical disability. 
*  Payment of a special benefit to persons entitled to attendance allowance, suffering 
from a severe disability.  The rate of this special benefit goes up with the rise in the 
degree of the disabled person’s dependence on others. 
*  Payment  of  an  additional  monthly  benefit  to  a  disabled  child  who  receives  a 
disability pension at a rate of 100% or more. 
*  Payment of an old-age pension at the rate of the disability pension (including the 
“additional monthly pension”) paid before the disabled person had reached the age 
entitling him to an old-age pension. This amendment applies to disabled persons 
who reached 65 on January 1, 2002 or thereafter. 
 
Economic Policy Law-2001 
*  Raising of medical threshold for entitlement to disability pension from 40% to 60%, 




Economy Arrangements Law–2002 
*  Shortening of maximum period of entitlement to injury allowance from 182 days to 
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Economy Recovery Plan-June 2003 
*  Reduction of lump-sum grant paid to persons whose medical disability, as a result of 
a work injury, is lower than 20%: from a sum equivalent to 70 benefits to a sum 
equivalent to 43 benefits. 
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Box 6 
Changes in Long-Term Care Insurance – Reduction in Number of Care 
Hours 
 
Emergency Economy Law-July 2002 
*  4%  reduction  in  long-term  care  benefit,  leading  to  a  half  hour  decrease  in  the 
number of care hours (from 11 hours to 10.5 hours for dependent elderly in the 
lower level of entitlement, and from 16 hours to 15.5 hours for those in the higher 
level of entitlement).  The reduction was carried out in September 2002.   
 
Economy Recovery Law-June 2003 
*  7%  reduction  of  benefit  to  elderly  in  the  lower  level  of  entitlement  led  to  an 
additional decrease of ¾ of an hour in the number of care hours (from 10.5 hours 
to 9.75 hours) for these elderly. 
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Box 7 
Other Related Amendments – Residence & Retroactive Payment of 
Benefits 
 
Economy Arrangements Law-2003 
 
*  Amendments  in  the  definition  of  residence,  as  a  condition  of  insurance  and  of 
entitlement to benefits: a person residing in Israel illegally or under one of specified 
visas will not be considered a resident. Also, a person who could be considered a 
resident according to his visa will not be considered as such if he had lived in the 
country for less than 183 days during the first year after having received the visa 
(with the exception of new immigrants). 
*  A person entitled to a benefit paid only in Israel who is absent from the country for 
a year or more will be entitled to this benefit only after he has returned and resided 
in  the  country  for  at  least  a  year.    This  rule  has  exceptions  applying  to  certain 
situations (such as persons leaving the country for purposes of medical treatment) 
and  certain  branches  (such  as  Maternity,  Work  Injury  and  Bankruptcy).  
Furthermore,  it  does  not  apply  to  persons  who  give  notice  beforehand  on  their 
absence from the country and on the length of this absence.  The rules will come 
into effect after the relevant legislation is prepared. 
*  Cancellation of payment of increment for dependents (spouse and children) in the 
framework of many benefits, when the dependents are not residents of Israel. 
*  A  foreign  worker  residing  in  Israel  illegally  may  receive  wage-replacing  benefits 
(work injury, maternity and bankruptcy) only when he is outside of the country. This 
restriction  does  not  apply  to  grants  (such  as  the  maternity  grant)  or  to  in-kind 
medical treatment (such as hospitalization of mothers giving birth). 
*  Limitation of the retroactive payment of benefits to 12 months preceding the date of 
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Box 8 
Changes in NII Collection System 
 
Economy Arrangements Law-2002 
*  Cancellation  of  1.2%  adjustment,  carried  out  in  January  2002,  in  collection 
parameters (such as scale of reduced rates, income ceiling liable for contributions 
and  minimum  income  for  payment  of  contributions  for  various  types  of  insured 
persons).  
 
Emergency Economy Law-July 2002 
*  Cancellation  of  income  ceiling  liable  for  national  insurance  and  health  insurance 
contributions as a temporary order for July 2002- December 2003. Up to July 2002, 
the income ceiling liable for contributions was 5 times the average wage on the 
share of the employee and the self-employed as a worker, and 4 times the average 
wage on the share of the employer for his worker and of the self-employed as an 
employer. 
*  Raising of insurance contributions by one percentage point to employers and self-
employed,  as  against  the  lowering  of  the  contributions  paid  by  the  government 
(indemnification) by one percentage point. 
*  Extension until the end of 2003 of the temporary order regarding non-adjustment of 
collection parameters in accordance with changes in the average wage. 
 
NII Law Amendment No. 50 (private bill approved by the Knesset-July 2002. 
*  Lowering of the reduced rates of NII contributions (imposed on income of up to half 
the average wage) deducted from employees  – from 2.66% to 1.4% of the income 
liable for contributions, in parallel to the raising of the regular rates from 4.9% to 
5.52%. 
 
Economy Recovery Law-June 2003 
*  Extension until the end of 2005 of temporary order regarding non-adjustment of 
collection parameters in accordance with changes in average wage. 
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*  Restoration of income ceiling liable for contributions to 5 times the average wage for 
workers, employers and self-employed, as of July 2003, before the expiration of the 
temporary order. 
*  Health insurance contributions imposed on housewives (married women who not 
employed outside their households). This measure has not been yet implemented.  
*  Injury  allowance  paid  to  work  injured  became  liable  for  national  insurance 
contributions.  
 
Economy Arrangements Law- 2003 
*  Equalizing rate of health insurance contributions imposed on soldiers in the standing 
army  to  the  rate  deducted  from  workers’  salaries.    Previous  to  the  change,  the 
former paid a lower rate of these contributions. 
 
Economic Policy Law-2004 
*  Obligating  recipients  of  early  pension  to  pay  national  and  health  insurance 
contributions on the full amount of their pension (instead of on half their pension), 
and at the same rates imposed on workers – except for the Unemployment branch. 
*  Cancellation of linkage of the ceiling to changes in the average wage as of 2006, 
and the adaptation of its level to price fluctuations.  The other parameters of the 
contribution system determined as percentages of the average wage will continue to 
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 2.1   Introduction 
 
As part of research carried out in Israel on poverty and income distribution, a relative 
approach to measuring poverty was formulated in the early 1970s, in line with that 
accepted by the majority of researchers and social policymakers in the western world. 
According to this approach, poverty is an expression of relative distress that should be 
evaluated in relation to the standard of living typical of a given society: a family is 
considered poor not only when it is unable to purchase a basic basket of products 
necessary for its subsistence, but also when its living conditions are significantly 
inferior to those characteristic of the society as a whole. The relative approach further 
recognizes that distress is not only reflected in low income, but may also be expressed 
in the level of assets, housing conditions, education and public services available to 
those in distress. Nevertheless, since there is no agreed index that takes into account 
all the constituent aspects of distress, and since the National Insurance Institute 
possesses data (taken from Central Bureau of Statistics Income Surveys) only for the 
current income of households in Israel, poverty is measured solely as a function of the 
latter. The relative approach offers several operative methods for measuring poverty 
based on the level of income which rely, as a common denominator, on a comparison 
of the level of income of families on the lowest scale of income with the level of 
income of all other families. Each method is predicated on a “poverty line” set as a 
percentage of the income which is “representative” of society. A family whose income 
is below the poverty line will be considered poor, without this necessarily implying 
that the family suffers from want in the form of hunger, malnutrition, threadbare 
clothing or dilapidated housing, but only that its income is significantly lower than the 
representative income. 
 
In Israel, the method for measuring poverty is based on the following three principles: 
 
a.  The first principle views the family’s net income as the relevant income for 
assessing poverty. Net income is defined as the family’s market income (from 
work as well as from ownership of physical production means and financial assets) 
plus transfer payments (received not in return for economic efforts, such as 
national insurance benefits or support from institutions and individuals in Israel 
and abroad), less direct taxes (income tax, national insurance contributions and 
health insurance contributions). 
 
b.  The second principle regards the median net income of the population as the 
society’s representative income. Median income is defined as the level of income 
which 50% of families have at least that income, while the remaining 50% have a 
higher level of income. The poverty line is defined as the level of income 
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than one half of the median net income is thus regarded as poor.
1 Economic 
growth leading to an increase in the median net income also results in the raising 
of the poverty line. A non-poor family whose net income has increased by less 
than the rate of increase of the poverty line may thus become a poor family. 
 
c.  The third principle adjusts the poverty line to the family size. This principle is 
based on the assumption that family size involves economics of scale, whereby the 
growth of a family by an additional person increases its needs not by an 
equivalent, but rather by a lesser, proportion. In other words, the additional income 
required by a family in order to maintain a fixed standard of living decreases with 
the increase in the number of family members. To enable a comparison between 
the standard of living of families of different sizes, an “equivalence scale” was 
developed by which the needs of each such family can be measured against the 
needs of a family of a given basic size. More specifically, the equivalence scale 
translates the number of persons in a family into the number of “standard” persons 
(or the number of “standard adults”) in that family (Table 1). The scale is based on 
a two-member family which is assigned a value of two standard persons. 
According to this scale, a family with one member has a value of 1.25 standard 
persons. In other words, the needs of a one-member family are not assessed as 
equivalent to one half the needs of a two-member family, but as greater. Similarly, 
the needs of a four-member family (which has a value of 3.2 standard persons) are 
not set at double the needs of a two-member family (which has a value of 2 
standard persons), but at less than double (only 1.6 times greater). 
 
In keeping with these principles, the poverty line per standard person in Israel was set 
at 50% of the median net income per standard person. A family in Israel is classified 
as poor if its net income, divided by the number of standard persons in the family, is 
lower than the poverty line per standard person. The poverty line per family can be 
calculated in a similar manner – by multiplying the poverty line per standard person 
by the number of standard persons in the family. 
 
The poverty line per standard person in 2002 stood at NIS 1,394 a month, compared 
with NIS 1,385 in 2001 (in current values for the respective survey periods). In real 
terms, the poverty line per standard person decreased by 4.7% compared to 2001. The 
average  wage in  the economy declined by 4.5% in real terms between the Income 
Survey dates. The poverty line per standard person remained 24.5% of the average 
wage in 2002. Table 1 presents the poverty lines for families of different sizes, in 
shekel values and as percentages of the average wage. 
                                                           
1     The median income is preferable to the average income, as representing the typical 
standard of living, since the latter is affected by extreme values in income distribution (i.e. 
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Table  1: Number of Standard Persons and the Poverty Line per Family, by 
Number of Family Members, 2000-2001  
 






percentage of the 
average wage  NIS per month 
      
 1  1.25   24.5   1,743  
 2  2.00   39.2   2,789  
 3  2.65   51.9   3,696  
 4  3.20   62.7   4,463  
 5  3.75   73.5   5,230  
 6  4.25   83.3   5,927  
 7  4.75   93.1   6,624  
 8  5.20   101.9   7,252  
 9    5.60   109.7   7,810  
      
 
 
As already indicated, the Annual Income Surveys conducted by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS) serve as the basis for calculating the dimensions of poverty and 
income inequality in Israel. Up until 1997 (inclusive), the survey population included 
households whose head was an employee or non-working person, in urban localities 
with 2,000 or more inhabitants (excluding East Jerusalem)
2. In 1998 the Central 
Bureau of Statistics decided to produce a combined Income Survey, based on both the 
current Income Survey and the Family Expenditures Survey. The combined Income 
Survey is based on a larger sample (1.8 times the previous sample) and encompasses 
95% of all households in Israel in most forms of settlement. In addition to the 
employee and non-working populations in urban localities, the combined Income 
Survey also covers the self-employed population, the population in the moshavim and 
in rural and community localities, and the inhabitants of East Jerusalem.
3 However, in 
2001 the inhabitants of East Jerusalem were not included in the survey, due to 
difficulties in data collection. For comparison purposes, the 2002 data were 
reproduced without East Jerusalem. 
                                                           
2     Up until 1994 (inclusive), the Income Surveys included non-Jewish localities with                   
10,000 or more inhabitants (excluding East Jerusalem). Since 1995, the Income Surveys 
have been expanded to include non-Jewish localities numbering 2,000–10,000 inhabitants.  
3   The populations not yet included are mainly the kibbutzim and the Beduin inhabitants who 
do not reside in permanent localities.  
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The present summary surveys the dimensions of poverty and income inequality in 
Israel in 2001-2002 on the basis of the combined Income Survey, and presents the 
main findings regarding the impact of transfer payments and direct taxes in reducing 
their scope. The dimensions of poverty are expressed by means of the two most 
widely used aggregate poverty indices in empirical studies, both in Israel and abroad: 
the poverty incidence and the poverty gap. The poverty incidence index indicates the 
scope of poverty in terms of the percentage of poor families in the total population. 
The poverty gap index reflects the depth of poverty: the poverty gap of a poor family 
is defined as the difference between the poverty line (corresponding to the family’s 
size) and the family’s actual income, while the poverty gap of the population as a 
whole is defined as the sum of the poverty gaps of the total number of poor families in 
the population. The poverty gap index can be standardized and defined as the ratio 
between the average poverty gap per poor family and the poverty line (hereafter, the 
“poverty gap ratio”). Income inequality among the entire population is measured by 
the GINI index. 
 
 
2.2   Main Developments 
 
The main developments in the dimensions of poverty in Israel in 2002 were as follows 
(Table 2): 
 
a.  In 2002 there was no change in the incidence of poverty in Israel compared to   
2001. The percentage of families whose net income (after transfer payments and 
direct taxes) was below the poverty  was 17.7% in 2002. 
 
b.  The number of poor families totaled 325,100 in 2002, compared to 318,400 in 
2001. The increase in the number of poor families resulted entirely from the 
population growth in the country. 
 
c.  The percentage of poor persons in the total population of persons declined slightly  
– from 19.6% in 2001 to 20.0% in 2002. 
 
d. The incidence of poverty among children rose significantly in 2002. The 
percentage of poor children in the total population of children rose from 24.9%  in 
1999  to  26.9% in  2001 and  to 28.1% in 2002. The number of poor persons 
reached 1,212,000 in 2002 (as compared to 1,164,100 in 2001), and included 
556,400 children (525,500 in 2001). Poverty and Income Inequality in Israel                                                                E59 
   
Table 2: Poverty in Total Population, by Selected Poverty Measures                





 direct taxes 
 




 and direct taxes 
2001 
Poor population         
       Families  605,700   258,700   3189,400  
       Persons  1,930,400   965,100   1,164,100  
       Children  753,700   450,200   525,500  
Incidence of poverty (%)       
       Families       33.6   14.4   17.7  
       Persons  32.5   16.3   19.6  
       Children  38.5   23.0   26.9  
Poverty gap ratio (%)*  65.3   26.2   26.1  
 
2002  
Poor population       
       Families  612,800   263,000   325,100  
       Persons  1,9541,100   1,024,500   1,212,000  
       Children  760,100   488,200   556,400  
Incidence of poverty (%)       
       Families     33.5   14.4   17.7  
       Persons  32.3   16.9   20.0  
       Children  38.3   24.6   28.1  
Poverty gap ratio (%)*  67.0   28.1   28.8  
* The weight given to each family in calculating the measure is equivalent to the number of 




e.  In 2002, the contribution of transfer payments and direct taxes to reducing the 
incidence of poverty decreased. Transfer payments and direct taxes extricated 
47.2% of the total number of poor families from poverty, as measured by market 
income, compared to 47.4% in 2001 (Table 3). The contribution of transfer 
payments and direct taxes to reducing the incidence of poverty among persons 
decreased by 38.1% (39.7% in 2001), and among children – by 26.6% compared 
to 30.3% in 2001. The contribution of transfer payments alone (excluding direct 
taxes) to reducing the incidence of poverty among families exceeded the joint 
contribution of transfer payments and direct taxes: 57.0% in 2002.  60E                                                                Poverty and Income Inequality in Israel  
 
The stability in the incidence of poverty by net income, which characterized the 
population as a whole, was not observed among all specific population groups. 
Specifically, while the poverty incidence among the elderly fell a bit, it rose slightly 
among large families and families headed by a non-worker who is of working age. 
Among other population groups, the incidence of poverty remained unchanged.  
 
 
Table 3: The  Impact  of  Transfer  Payments and Direct Taxes on Poverty  in                
Total Population, by Selected Poverty Measures, 2001-2002 
   
Percentage of decrease 
stemming from transfer 
payments only 
Percentage of decrease 
stemming from transfer 
payments and direct taxes 
    Poverty measure 
2001  2002  2001  2002 
        
Incidence of poverty (%)        
    Families  57.3 57.0  47.4  47.2 
    Persons  50.0 47.7  39.7  38.1 
    Children  40.3 35.8  30.3  26.6 
Poverty gap ratio (%)*  59.3 60.0  58.1  57.0 
*  See note to Table 2.  
 
There were marked differences in the dimensions of poverty by geographical 
dispersion and locality. Bnei Brak, Jerusalem and Ashdod are the poorest cities of 
Israel according to the poverty indices: 20%-31% of families living in these cities 
have a net income below the poverty line.   
 
In 2002 there was a widening of income gaps in the economy. The Gini index for 
distribution of economic income (stemming mainly from the family’s work as 
employee and self-employed) increased from 0.5277 in 2001 to 0.5320 in 2002 – an 
increase of 0.8%. The Gini index for inequality in income distribution in housheolds 
headed by employees increased by 1.4% (from 0.4389 in 2001 to 0.4452 in 2002).  
 
In 2002, the contribution of benefits and direct taxes – both separately and together – 
to reducing economic income gaps decreased (from 32.5% in 2001 to 32.0% in 2002). 
As a result, the Gini index for inequality in net income rose between 2002 and 2001 
by 1.5% (from 0.3564 to 0.3616), reaching a total rise of 4.2% since 1998.  
 
The expansion in inequality reflects a rise in the share of the upper decile, countering a 
decline in the share of the two lower deciles. Slight changes only occurred in the share 
of the other deciles between the two years. The share of the lowest fifth quintile in Poverty and Income Inequality in Israel                                                                E61 
   
total net income amounted to only 6.3%, whereas the upper fifth quintile took 42.2% 
of the total net income.  
 
An appendix of tables and graphs appears at the end of this chapter. 
 














and taxes  
 Total population   
 
   
2002 0.5320  0.3616  32.0 
2001 0.5277  0.3564  32.5 
2000 0.5088  0.3500  31.5 
1999 0.5120  0.3545  30.8 
1998 0.5065  0.3469  31.5 
 
Change in Gini Index (%) 
 
  













Households of employees  
 
  
2002 0.4452   0.3261   26.8  
2001  0.4389   0.3215   26.7  
2000  0.4390   0.3214   26.8  
1999  0.4305  0.3166  26.5  
1998  0.4319  0.3167  26.7  
 
Change in Gini Index (%)  
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